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HOWWE GOT HERE: CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR IN
EVERYDAY REASON
The discovery of conceptual metaphor independently by Michael
Reddy and myself in the late 1970’s showed that metaphor is
primarily conceptual, and secondarily linguistic, gestural, and
visual (Reddy, 1979; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980/2002). There
are metaphorical ideas everywhere and they affect how we act.
Metaphorical thought and the metaphorical understanding of sit-
uations arises independent of language. This discovery led almost
immediately to the hypothesis that everyday reason that is under-
stood as “abstract” (not just about “concrete” physical objects and
actions) make use of embodiedmetaphorical thought (Lakoff and
Johnson, 1999).
Reddy had found that the abstract concepts of communication
and ideas are understood via a conceptual metaphor:
• Ideas Are Objects.
• Language Is a Container for Idea-Objects.
• Communication Is Sending Idea-Objects in
Language-Containers.
This notation from Lakoff and Johnson characterizes a conceptual
mapping from a “source domain” frame for sending objects in
containers to a “target domain” frame for communicating ideas
via language.
Reddy found over 100 classes of expressions for this metaphor.
Examples include: You finally got through to him. The meaning
is right there in the words. Put your thoughts into clear language.
Your words are hollow. And many more. His point was that the
generalization covering the linguistic metaphors was not in lan-
guage, but in the metaphorical concept of communication as
sending idea-objects in language-containers.
Reddy furthermore pointed out that the metaphor created
an important inference about communication: the speaker is
primarily responsible for its success. If you put an object in a
container and send it, the receiver will find the same object inside.
Reddy observes that in real communication, the hearer has as
much responsibility as the speaker, and that what the hearer hears
is very often not what the speaker intends. However, themetaphor
is often taken literally, as it were true.
METAPHOR SYSTEMS AND DOMAINS OF THOUGHT
A crucial idea in the study of metaphor is the conceptual metaphor
system for characterizing a domain of thought. This idea was first
worked out by Eve Sweetser and Alan Schwartz (see Lakoff and
Johnson, 1999, chapter 12). They observed that there is a domain
of Mind (a metaphorical target) that is understood via a very
general metaphor that is in turn split into four subcases, each
associated with a separate source domain. The general metaphor
is the follow conceptual mapping:
• The Mind Is a Body.
• Mental Functioning Is Bodily Functioning.
• Ideas Are Objects of Bodily Functioning.
The four special case conceptual metaphors are:
• Thinking Is Moving; Ideas are Locations; Communicating is
Leading; Understanding is Following.
• Understanding is Seeing; Ideas are Things Seen;
Communication Is Showing.
• Thinking Is Object Manipulation; Ideas Are Objects;
Communication Is Sending; Understanding is Grasping.
• Thinking Is Eating; Ideas Are Food; Communication is
Feeding; Understanding is Digesting.
There are many linguistic examples of each.
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• Moving: reach a conclusion; go off on a tangent; do you follow
me; go step-by-step, . . .
• Seeing: see what I mean; point of view; shed light on; clear;
brilliant, . . .
• Manipulating: turn it over in your mind; toss ideas around; I gave
him that idea;. . .
• Eating: food for thought; raw facts; half-baked ideas; digest; He
won’t swallow that; . . .
What seems to define these domains are embodied brain regions
or structures significantly involved in performing these func-
tions. The questions raised by this analysis are, What is a domain
in the brain? What defines a metaphor system and a domain
neurally?
Domains seem to be characterized by hierarchically structured
frames. A frame is a complex schema, a mental structure that
organizes knowledge. Each framemakes use of primitive concepts
and may make use of conceptual metaphors. The elements of a
frame are called Semantic Roles.
For example, the semantic roles of the Seeing Frame are: The
Viewpoint, The Viewer, Eyes, Light, The Directing of the Eyes,
The Act of Seeing, Things Seen, The Gaze (the line from the eyes
to the thing seen); Degree of Clarity. There is also knowledge
about seeing: You need enough light to see; light has a source;
the gaze must extend from the eyes to the thing seen in order to
see; things look different from different viewpoints; and so on.
A crucial thing we learn from this is that important abstract
concepts are notmerely understood via one conceptual metaphor,
but via multiple conceptual metaphors that provide different
understandings of the concepts. For example, Communication
is not just Sending, but it is also Leading (when Thinking
is Moving), Showing (when Understanding is Seeing Clearly),
and Feeding (when Thinking is Eating). Ideas, metaphorically,
can be not only Manipulable Objects, but Locations and Food
as well.
Lakoff and Johnson (1999) have shown that important con-
cepts like Event, Action, Causation, the Mind, the Self, Morality,
and Being are each defined via multiple conceptual metaphors,
sometimes between a dozen and two dozen.
I made a discovery similar to Reddy’s at about the same time. I
had found that the abstract concept of Love is commonly under-
stood in terms of a Journey. There are lots of linguistic expressions
of this sort: Our relationship hit a dead-end street. The marriage is
on the rocks. We’re getting nowhere in this relationship. We’re going
in different directions. We’re at a crossroads in our relationship.
We’re spinning our wheels in this relationship.Andmanymore. The
generalization over these cases is not in the linguistic expressions
but in a conceptual mapping (indicated by “==>”).
• Travelers ==> Lovers.
• Vehicle ==> Relationship.
• Common Destinations ==> Common Life Goals.
• Impediments to Travel ==> Relationship Difficulties.
EMBODIED PRIMARY METAPHORS
Mark Johnson and I later discovered that this complex metaphor
was made up of more basic components. There are primitive
metaphors that are acquired in ordinary daily life when two basic
embodied experiences regularly occur together. For example,
purposes are understood as destinations. In everyday life, achiev-
ing purposes often requires getting to a destination. If you want
a cold beer, you’ll have to go to the refrigerator. In American cul-
ture, people are expected to have goals in life, and a couple in
a long-term love relationship is expected to have compatible life
goals. Metaphorically that means having common destinations.
A relationship is a metaphorical vehicle for three reasons: First, a
vehicle is a means of getting to a destination. Second, a vehicle is
a container. In general, relationships are understood in terms of
containers: you are in relationship; you can enter or leave a rela-
tionship. Third, intimacy is understood metaphorically in terms
of closeness:We’re very close; we’re drifting apart. Thus, a relation-
ship is conceptualized as a container in which you are close and
which is a means for reaching destinations.
Johnson and I reasoned as follows: Why is intimacy
metaphorized as closeness? Because intimacy requires being phys-
ically close. Why is a relationship a container? Because when you
are growing up, you tend to live in the same enclosed space as your
relatives. Purposes are conceptualized as destinations because,
over and over again, to achieve a purpose you have to go to a
specific location. The general principle is that regular correlations
in real-world embodied experience leads to primitive conceptual
metaphors—embodied primary metaphors using embodied promi-
tive concepts—that can combine to form complex conceptual
metaphors, like the Live Is a Journey metaphor.
These considerations led directly to the theory of embod-
ied cognition. The most popular theory of meaning at the time
was that concepts were all literal, that there were no metaphor-
ical concepts, and that concepts got their meaning via truth
conditions—directly from conditions holding objectively in the
real world, independent of the intervention of human minds and
brains. The existence of conceptual metaphors did not fit that the-
ory. The idea that there are primitive conceptual metaphors that
arise from regular correlations in embodied experience did not fit
that theory. If we were right, then a new theory of meaning for
concepts was necessary.
The most obvious candidate was a theory of embodied cog-
nition. Physical concepts, like running and jumping, chairs and
people, could be understood through the sensorimotor system:
they can be performed, seen, felt. If abstract concepts get their
meaning via conceptual metaphor, and if complex conceptual
metaphors are made up of primitive conceptual metaphors that
get their meaning via embodied experience, then the meaning of
concepts comes through embodied cognition.
If that was so, Johnson and I realized that there should
be significant real-world consequences. Take the metaphor of
Labor as a Resource, where companies seek cheap labor, with
workers seen as interchangeable commodities to be purchased
for minimum cost in a labor market and working people are
hired though the “Human Resource Department.” Thus, corpo-
rations, to maximize profits, should seek to minimize the “cost”
of labor—by cutting pay and benefits, outsourcing, and laying off
workers whenever possible. Johnson and I saw enormous social
and political consequences arising from abstract thought being
characterized metaphorically.
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METAPHOR AND THE MEANING OF IDIOMS
The earliest examples we looked at took us to the study of idioms.
The traditional theory held that idioms had arbitrary meanings.
We discovered that the meanings of a huge range of idioms were
anything but arbitrary. They made use of conceptual metaphors!
But not in any obvious way.
The first one I looked at was: We’re spinning our wheels in this
relationship. It has a conventional image, with knowledge about
the image: The wheels are on a car. The car is stuck with the wheels
spinning (either in sand, or on ice, etc.). The car isn’t moving.
We’re putting a lot of effort into getting it moving, but it won’t
move. We are frustrated.
The Love Is a Journey mapping applies to the conceptual
knowledge about the image. The car (a vehicle) is the relation-
ship, the travelers are lovers and they are not making progress
toward common destinations (compatible life goals). They feel
frustrated.
That is what it means to be spinning your wheels in a relation-
ship. The conceptual metaphor applies to knowledge about the
image, yielding the meaning of the idiom!
But although the Love Is a Journey metaphor applies system-
atically in understanding this idiom, the literal meanings of the
words in the idiom (“spinning” and “wheels”) are not mapped by
this metaphor. Those words activate a conventional mental image
with associated knowledge commonplace in one’s culture. There
is a system of metaphors fixed in the mind that applies naturally,
automatically, very quickly, and unconsciously to such knowl-
edge, linking the knowledge of the image to the meaning of the
idiom.
There are a huge number of idioms like this. Consider The
marriage is on the rocks. The marriage (the relationship) is a boat
(a vehicle). A boat on the rocks is not moving forward. The couple
in the boat is not progressing toward their common destination
(compatible life goals). The boat is likely to be harmed in some
way. Even if it gets free of the rocks, it may not be able to continue
on the journey. That is, even if the marriage survives, the couple
may still split up. And when the boat hits the rocks, the passengers
may be hurt physically. Given the metaphor that psychological
harm is physical harm, the couple may be psychologically harmed
by the incident.
If you have that image for the idiom and that knowledge about
the image, then that is what the idiommeansmetaphorically. That
same Love is a Journey metaphor, applying to a different image
and knowledge, yields a different meaning.
These constitute a special class of idioms: they are both are
imageable and metaphorical. New ones are being created all the
time (Lakoff, 1987, case study 2).
A Note: Metaphorical mappings occur at a certain level of gen-
eralization. In the Love Is A Journey metaphor, the relationship
is a generalized vehicle. There are special cases of vehicles: cars,
boats, planes (We may have to bail out), rockets (We’ve just taken
off), trains (We’re off the track). It’s important to recognize the
general level of the conceptual metaphor. Encountering The mar-
riage is on the rocks, you should not conclude that the conceptual
metaphor is Love Is a Boat.
A caution: Not every speaker has the same image and knowl-
edge. For example, some speakers understand “on the rocks” in
terms of a scotch on the rocks image and the idiom will seem
to them to have an arbitrary meaning. For them, the Love is a
Journey metaphor does not apply, and idiom is not metaphorical.
It works for them as if it were a single lexical item with an arbi-
trary meaning, that is, one that does follow from the language.
For example, it may mean, “will probably get a divorce.”
On the other hand, the arbitrary meaning may use a differ-
ent conceptual metaphor, as in The couple will probably split up,
which uses the conceptual metaphor that a relationship is a single
entity made up of two parts. “Splitting up”means the relationship
comes apart and there is no longer a single entity.
When a neuroscientist is using an idiom in metaphor research
where there is averaging over a number of subjects, it is impor-
tant to make sure that all the subjects use the same metaphor
in understanding the idiom. That is not easy to do. Moreover,
the metaphor may apply systematically not to the words “spin”
and “wheels,” or to the words “on” and “rocks,” but rather to the
concepts in the way the image is understood—if it is understood
at all!
Some idioms are completely arbitrary, that is, you cannot fig-
ure out the meaning from the words. Take “by and large.” It was
originally a nautical term from the days of sailing ships. To sail
“by” meant close by the wind, whereas to sail “large,” meant
with the wind fully behind you filling the sails (making them
large). If a ship sailed well both “by and large,” then it sailed
well under most conditions. Via the commonplace metaphor that
Action Is Motion, with sailing as a special case of motion, sailing
by and large came metaphorically to mean action by and large,
that is, under most conditions. With the complete loss of “by
and large” in its nautical meaning, the meaning of “by and large”
kept the meaning of “mostly” but the systematic metaphorical
relationship to the words was lost.
Some neuroscientists choose to study idioms with body part
names like hand, or words for what body parts do, like kick or
bite. The point is to see if the relevant body part word acti-
vates the brain region in the topographic map of the body in the
motor cortex. But such idioms vary in their degree of arbitrariness
and directness. There is a commonplace conceptual metaphor,
Control Is Control by the Hands. It occurs in the understanding
of idioms like It’s in your hands now, He’s got the whole world in
his hands, They handed over the company to the Mafia. In these
cases there is a relatively direct metaphorical connection between
hands and control. But that particular metaphor is not present
in the understanding of He’s an old hand at phonological analy-
sis; Tax cuts are handouts to the wealthy; Don’t bite the hand that
feeds you.
The idiom kick the bucket has been used in some neuroscience
experiments to see if there is activation in the foot region of the
motor cortex. What would one expect? Not much. First, there is
a lot of variation across speakers. For many speakers it is an arbi-
trary idiom, with the meaning of kick playing no role at all in the
meaning. For some there is a weak mental image. Here is mine:
The bucket is upright. There is some but not much liquid in it.
It is weakly kicked over and what liquid there is spills out, and it
is empty and on its side after the kick. There is a common con-
ceptual metaphor that seems to be applying here: Life is a Fluid in
the Body, as in sentences like The life drained out of him; He’s full of
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life; He’s brimming with life. The spilling out of the fluid from the
bucket means death. But since there was not much fluid in it in
the first place, it suggests a particular kind of death—death when
there is not much life left, as with an old person expected to die
soon. You won’t say She kicked the bucket of a child run over by a
car or a young woman who died in childbirth.
Incidentally an image like mine appears in a prominent place
in two popular movies. In It’s a Mad, Mad, Mad, Mad World,
Jimmy Durante plays an old man who dies of a heart attack on a
mountain. As rigor mortis sets in, his leg goes out and kicks over a
bucket that tumbles down the mountain. In Young Frankenstein,
the man soon to become the monster dies and, in rigor mortis,
kicks over a slop bucket at the edge of the bed. The kicking of
the bucket is a comic way of indicating death, a visual pun in two
slapstick movies.
But for many speakers, kick the bucket is an arbitrary idiom,
with no mental image of kicking. Even in the best of cases, one
shouldn’t expect much by way of foot activation in the motor
cortex. The kicking is only indirectly connected to the death, and
then only via a conceptual metaphor that has nothing directly to
do with kicking. In addition, the bucket may be a container, like
the body, but that’s a weak connection. And for most speakers,
there is no connection at all.
The morals for neuroscientists: Be aware of what kind of
idioms you are using in your experiments andwhat their cognitive
analysis is. Always list the idioms you are using in any write-up of
your experiment. And test your subjects for the images they may
or may not associate with the idioms.
EMOTION METAPHORS
In the early 1980’s, Zoltán Kövecses and I discovered that sys-
tems of emotionmetaphors arise from the physiology of emotions
(Lakoff, 1987; Kövecses, 2000, 2002). For example, Paul Ekman
and his colleagues found that when one is angry, skin tempera-
ture rises, blood pressure increases, and there is interference with
accurate visual perception and fine motor control (Ekman et al.,
1983). That is why we get such linguistic metaphorical expressions
as boiling mad, He exploded, blind with rage, hopping mad, and
many more (Lakoff, 1987, Case Study 1), (Wilkowski et al., 2009).
Damasio (1996) has observed that such bodily experiences
have correlates in the brain’s somatosensory systemwhich are reg-
istered and can be seen via neuroimaging in the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex as “somaticmarkers” that play an important role
indecision making. This raises the possibility that emotions are
constituted by the bodily effects that are registered in brain dur-
ing emotional experience. Thus, it would be natural for emotions
to be metaphorically conceptualized as those bodily effects, as
Kövecses and I observed. This accords with the theoretical model
of Lindeman and Abramson (2008) of the causal mechanisms of
depression. They hypothesize that “(a) the inability to alter events
is conceptualized metaphorically as motor incapacity; (b) as part
of this conceptualization, the experience of motor incapacity is
mentally simulated; and (c) this simulation leads to both feelings
of lethargy and peripheral physiological changes consistent with
motor incapacity.”
These ideas, together with our emotion metaphor research,
raises the possibility that one can get insight into emotional
states via neuroscience and the study of linguistic metaphors for
physical states.
METAPHOR SCIENCE IN LANGUAGE
Awhole field of metaphor science developed after 1980, including
research on the role of conceptual metaphor in grammar. The first
major paper on construction grammar came out in 1987, a 100+
page study of There-constructions that demonstrated the impor-
tance of conceptual metaphor in grammar (Lakoff, 1987, Case
study 3). Since then, Adele Goldberg and Ellen Dodge, in book-
length studies, have demonstrated how conceptual metaphors
work in grammatical constructions (Goldberg, 1995; Dodge,
2010). Following those insights, Karen Sullivan has since provided
the first general theory of how conceptual metaphor structures
grammatical constructions (Sullivan, 2007, 2013).
Why does research on metaphor in grammar matter for an
understanding of abstract thought? Because that research appears
to show that there is a bifurcation in the way conceptual metaphor
works in abstract thought.
(1) There is a language-independent system in which abstract
thought is understood metaphorically.
(2) Language uses this system and extends it to a huge new range
of abstract thought via metaphor. In the lexicon, this works
via radial categories of lexical meanings (Lakoff, 1987, Case
study 2). In grammar, indefinitely large extension works via
the metaphor-in-grammar principles discovered by Sullivan
(2013). An outstanding introductory text on these matters
is (Dancygier and Sweetser, 2014). Examples will be given
below.
MAPPING METAPHOR CIRCUITRY
In 1988, Jerome Feldman and I set up the Neural Theory of
Language group at the International Computer Science Institute
at UC Berkeley. Its goal was to apply neural computation to results
in cognitive linguistics and embodied cognition (Feldman, 2006).
In 1997, Srini Narayanan worked out a neural computational
theory of metaphor in his dissertation (Narayanan, 1997) and
has expanded on that work greatly since then (Feldman and
Narayanan, 2004; Loenneker-Rodman and Narayanan, 2012). He
and I have been working on a theory of the neural circuitry
required for thought and language. The following is a discussion
of the current status of our research as it applies to metaphor.
• First, a statement of the theory.
• Second, an account of primitive embodied concepts and pri-
mary metaphors, which we see as the building blocks of
abstract thought.
• Third, examples of common complexes of primary metaphors,
to provide a sense of how commonplace abstract ideas that are
complex arise from combinations of metaphor primitives, and
how primary metaphor form systems of abstract thought.
• Fourth, examples of how complex combinations of multiple
linguistic metaphors create complex abstract meanings.
• And finally, how all this fits into the current theory of neu-
ral cascades linking thoughts and language that expresses those
thoughts.
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OUR CURRENT NEURAL THEORY OF METAPHOR
Our current theory begins with a basic observation: The divi-
sion between concrete and abstract thought is based on what can
be observed from the outside. Physical entities, properties, and
activities are “concrete.” What is not visible is called “abstract:”
emotions, purposes, ideas, and understandings of other non-
visible things (freedom, time, social organization, systems of
thought, and so on). From the perspective of the brain, each of
those abstractions are physical, because all thought and under-
standing is physical, carried out by neural circuitry. That puts
“concrete” and “abstract” ideas on the same basis in the brain.
Where conceptual metaphor theorists saw conceptual metaphor
as conceptualizing the abstract in terms of the concrete, neural
metaphor theory linked neural circuitry to other neural circuitry,
allowing for a uniform theory, as follows:
• The human brain is structured by thousands of embod-
ied metaphor mapping circuits that create an extraordinary
richness within the human conceptual system. They largely
function unconsciously.
• These mapping circuits asymmetrically link distinct brain
regions, allowing reasoning patterns from one brain region to
apply to another brain region (Lakoff, 2009).
• Each circuit characterizes a different form of metaphorical
thought. Though metaphorical in content, the circuits reflect
a reality, namely, real correspondences in real-world physical
and social experiences starting in infancy.
• Where the experiences are essentially the same across cultures,
the metaphor mappings tend to be the same. They appear to be
learned by experience via neural learning. The asymmetry of
the mappings appears to arise via STDP—spike-timing depen-
dent plasticity—from which metaphor sources and targets can
be predicted.
• Simple metaphorical thought is learned prior to, and indepen-
dent of language, and plays an important role in the shaping of
grammatical form (Johnson, 1999).
• Complex metaphorical thought is formed via a neural binding
mechanism, to be discussed below.
• Complex metaphorical thought shows up not just in language,
but in gesture, imagery (paintings, movies, dance, etc.), in
mathematics (Lakoff and Núñez, 2000), science (Brown, 2003;
Nersessian, 2008), and in moral and political ideology. (Lakoff,
1996/2002, 2004, 2006).
• The compositional properties of language, not surprisingly,
lead to an unbounded range of complex metaphorical thought
expressed linguistically.
• In the theory of neural cascades proposed by Srini Narayanan
and myself, bidirectional cascades of neural activation link
complex form (most notably, linguistic form) to complex
metaphorical meanings characterized via connections to and
from many brain regions.
• Metaphorical inferences arise via the neural simulation of situ-
ations that are understood, at least in part, via the activation of
metaphor mapping circuits characterizing how the situations
to be simulated are understood.
• The compositional properties of language allow for an even
greater unbounded range of complex metaphorical thought,
but still understood via embodied primitive concepts and
primary metaphors.
PRIMITIVE CONCEPTS AND PRIMARY METAPHORS
Primitive concepts
The research of Talmy (2000), Langacker (1987), Fillmore (1968),
Narayanan (1997) has indicated that there are embodied primi-
tive concepts that arise in all natural languages.
Primitive concepts are all embodied via brain circuitry linked
to the body via the sensorimotor system (Regier, 1997). Motion,
for example, is characterized both via topographic maps of the
visual field in which activation moves across the visual map, coor-
dinated with executing circuitry for moving the body from an
initial location, through a course of motion, to a final location.
The embodiment circuitry for different primitive concepts
makes use of different parts of brain, which are anatomically
organized by links to the body. For example, topographic maps
for motion are in region MT (or V5) in the occipito-temporal
lobe, while sequentially operating circuitry for executing bod-
ily movement occurs in the premotor and supplementary motor
cortices.
We know from research on mirror neuron systems that there
are premotor-parietal pathways for linking action with vision
(and imagined vision) (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996;
Gallese and Lakoff, 2005).
We (that is, researchers in embodied neurocognition) hypoth-
esize that primitive concepts have a schema structure that medi-
ates between embodiment circuitry and complex concepts that
are expressed by linguistic structures in natural language.
Elementary schemas have a Part-whole structure, with the
entire schema as the Whole and the Semantic Roles as the Parts.
Examples of Primitive Schemas with their Semantic Roles include:
• Motion (with a Mover, Source, Path, Goal, and possible
Impediment),
• Containment (with an Interior, Boundary, and Exterior),
• Forces (with a Forcer, ForcedEntity, ForceDirection,
ForceAmount, ForceEvent, and Force Result),
• PurposefulActions (with Precondition, Beginning Act, Central
Act, Check for Achievement of a Purpose, Finishing Act, Final
State, Consequence),
• and many more.
From a neural perspective, the elements of a schema are neu-
ral ensembles (called “nodes”), linked together to form a “neural
gestalt.” A neural gestalt is defined by very simple activation
strengths and threshold conditions: each semantic role node,
when activated, activates the whole schema node, which in turn
activates all of its role nodes.
Complex concepts are formed by neural binding circuits,
which bind together schemas in different parts of the brain.
A simple example is the concept INTO, which brings together
schemas for Motion and Containment: the Source of the Motion
is bound to the Exterior of a bounded region and the Goal of the
Motion is bound to the Interior of the bounded region.
A Binding Circuit links two semantic role nodes in different
schemas in different locations. It has to meet certain conditions.
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The schemas have to be able to function independently or as a
single complex schema. The bound nodes have to be taken as
“identical;” that is, they have to indistinguishable in their firing
patterns. Both conditions are accomplished as follows.
(1) There are two-way neural connections between the nodes, so
that the firing of each one leads to the firing of the other.
(2) There is a node that functions as a “gate” modulating the
synapses connecting the two nodes. When the gate is not
firing, the circuit is shut off for lack of sufficient neurotrans-
mitters in its synapses. When the gate is firing, it introduces
sufficient neurotransmitters in the synapses to allow the
binding circuit to fire in both directions, coordinating the
firing the two nodes.
Binding circuits are the primary mechanism of neural composi-
tion forming complex concepts by binding nodes across diverse
brain regions.
Primary metaphors
Primary metaphors (Grady, 1997) are circuits that map primi-
tive neural schemas onto other primitive neural schemas. This
occurs when those pairs of neural schemas are regularly activated
together because of real-world experience.
Here is a commonplace example. It is a very common occur-
rence in everyday life that one has to go to a specific location in
order to achieve a given purpose. If you want a cold beer, you
have go to the refrigerator where the beer is kept. If you want
to brush your teeth, you have to the bathroom where the tooth-
brush and toothpaste are kept. And so on, case after case, day after
day. Even infants, to feel secure, have to crawl over to where their
favorite toy animal or their blanket is lying. These experiences give
rise to the primary metaphor Purposes Are Destinations, which is
widespread around the world. It maps the Motion Schema onto
the Purposeful Action Schema as follows:
• The Mover maps to the Actor.
• The Motion maps to the Action.
• The Motion Source maps to the Action Precondition.
• The Motion Goal maps to the Purpose.
• An Impediment to Motion maps to a Difficulty in achieving
the Purpose.
Each of these is a submapping; the whole collection of mappings
jointly constitutes the metaphor mapping.
This mapping reflects a real-world fact. In the repeated experi-
ences of going to a location to achieve a purpose, the elements of
the motion schema correspond to the elements of the purposeful
action schema. That is, the Actor is the Mover, the Action is the
Motion, and so on.
Each of these correspondences in experience has a reflex in the
brain: the corresponding nodes occur in different brain regions,
but they fire together. Here is our hypothesis:
• The nodes that regularly fire together strengthen (via Hebbian
learning) with regular firing.
• The neural activation spreads out from each neuron along
existing pathways, creating neural links that get stronger as
regular firing continues. The spreading keeps extending and
strengthening.
• Eventually a shortest pathway is reached and a circuit is formed
linking the two nodes.
• That circuit is the metaphor.
• Along that pathway there will be neural connections going in
opposite directions, creating pairs of neurons where the axon
extensions of each forms synapses with the dendrites of the
other.
• This creates the condition for STDP—Spike-timing dependent
plasticity—in which the synapse of the neuron that regularly
spikes first is strengthened in its direction and the synapse of
the other, later-firing neuron is weakened.
• The result is an asymmetric activation pattern, with activation
going from Source to Target.
What determines the direction of first spiking? The answer is sim-
ple: the direction from which most activation comes regularly.
That will be the metaphorical Source.
When we look at examples, this explanation appears to hold.
Here are some examples:
• More is Up, Less is Down. Examples: Stock prices went up. Turn
the radio down. Here Verticality is the Source and Quantity
is the Target. Why? Because the brain is always comput-
ing verticality (even when you are sleeping) but not always
computing quantity. Thus, there is more activation regularly
flowing from the Verticality region to the Quantity region,
which will lead to first-spiking ion the Quantity to Verticality
direction.
• Affection is Warm; Disaffection Is Cold. Examples: He’s a
warm person. She’s cold as ice. Here Temperature is the Source
domain, and Affection is the Target. Why? The brain is always
computing temperature, but not always computing affection.
Thus, there is more activation regularly flowing from the
Temperature region to the Affection region, which will lead to
first-spiking in the Temperature to Affection direction.
• Purposes are Destinations. Examples: There’s nothing stand-
ing in my way. I hit a roadblock on this project. He has reached
his goal. This, of course, another obvious example. Not all
of out motions are purposeful. We do a lot of aimless mov-
ing. This the Motion Schema will be activated more than the
Purposeful Action Schema, resulting in first-spiking occurring
in the Motion to Action direction, predicting that Motion will
spike first in its direction and so will be the metaphorical
Source.
So far, this works for themany cases checked out. The result is that
the Source and Targets of primary metaphors can be predicted by
the STDP theory of neural learning, which is a truly remarkable
result.
There are hundreds, if not thousands, of primary metaphors
structuring our conceptual system. They are learned via neural
learning mechanisms early in life, usually before language, just by
functioning in the everyday world.
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Each primary metaphor neurally maps one primitive schema
onto another, creating an asymmetric circuit linking them. But
each primitive schema can also occur independently of any
metaphor circuitry. That means that the metaphor circuitry must
be gated: normally the gates modulating the connecting synapses
would not be firing above base rate; the metaphor circuit is
turned on when the gates are turned on, emitting sufficient
neurotransmitters to allow activation to flow.
Each submapping has a gate. In the whole mapping, the
gates work together. How? The theory requires the submapping
gates and the gate for the whole mapping to form a gestalt cir-
cuit. Activating any submapping activates the whole mapping,
and activating the whole mapping activates each submapping.
As before, gestalt circuits have easy-to-learn combinations of
activation and threshold strengths.
EMBODIED COGNITION: THE EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In Narayanan’s theory of primary metaphor, the metaphors are
neural circuits asymmetrically linking two brain regions, a source
region to a target region, with inferences from the source region
used in the target region. That means that the physical con-
sequences of source domain activation will, via the metaphor
circuitry, yield corresponding target domain activation. It fol-
lows that the activation of metaphor circuitry can prime target
domain behavior, where “prime” means that it contributes neu-
ral activation that makes the behavior more likely. Here are some
cases of conceptual metaphors and the confirming experiments,
in which there is source domain brain activation connected via
metaphor circuitry to target domain brain regions that govern
target domain behavior.
• Metaphor: Psychological Pain is Physical Pain.
• Study: Singer et al. (2006).
• Effect: In physical pain, the bilateral anterior insula and the
anterior cingulate were active. They were also active in observ-
ing the experience of pain in a loved one. But with a stranger,
the pain reaction in the anterior insula is lower.
• Metaphors: Crime Is a Virus vs. Crime is a Beast.
• Study: Thibodeau and Boroditsky (2013).
• Effect: When crime was framed metaphorically as a virus, par-
ticipants proposed investigating the root causes of the problem
and treating the community by enacting social reform by, for
instance, eradicating poverty and improving education. When
crime was framed metaphorically as a beast, participants took
a much more direct approach in their proposals: catching and
jailing criminals and enacting harsher enforcement laws.
• Metaphor: Morality is Purity.
• Study: Zhong and Liljenquist (2006).
• Effect: Subjects were asked to recall either a moral or immoral
act in their past. Afterward, as a token of appreciation, the
experimenters offered the subjects a choice between the gift of
a pencil or of a package of antiseptic wipes. Those who had
described an immoral act were more likely to choose the wipes.
In a similar study later, subjects either did or did not have
the opportunity to clean their hands. Those who were able to
wash were less likely to respond to a request for help (that the
experimenters had set up) that came shortly afterward. That is,
washing expunged the guilt, and they saw no need to perform
a helping act to expunge their guilt.
• Metaphor: Achieving a Purpose (or Desire) Is Reaching a
Destination.
• Study: Harmon-Jones et al. (2011).
• Effect: “Leaning embodies desire: Evidence that leaning for-
ward increases relative left frontal cortical activation to appeti-
tive stimuli.”
• Metaphor: Affection Is Warmth.
• Study: Williams and Bargh (2008).
• Effect: Subjects holding warm coffee in advance were more
likely to evaluate an imaginary individual as warm and friendly
than those holding cold coffee.
• Metaphor: Affection Is Warmth.
• Study: Zhong and Leonardelli (2008).
• Effect: Subjects were asked to remember a time when they
were either socially accepted or socially snubbed. Those with
warmmemories of acceptance judged the room to be 5 degrees
warmer on the average than those who remembered being
coldly snubbed.
• Metaphor: Important Is Heavy.
• Study: Zhong and Liljenquist (2006).
• Effect: Students told that that a particular book was important
judged it to be physically heavier than a book that they were
told was unimportant.
• Metaphor: Important Is Heavy.
• Study: Jostmann et al. (2009).
• Effect: Subjects with the heavy clipboards were more likely to
judge currency to be more valuable and their opinions and
their leaders more important than those with light clipboards.
Why does this happen? Conceptual metaphors are asymmetrical
physical circuits in the brain allowing the consequences of source
domain activation to apply in the cases of target domain activa-
tion. Those consequences can be a sense of filth after immoral
behavior, inferences affecting crime policy, feelings of pain in
empathy with a loved one, leaning forward physically, judgments
of importance or temperature, and so on.
Experimental results of this sort were predicted by the idea of
embodied conceptual metaphor. The experimental confirmation
goes well beyond the cases just listed. The following two dozen
studies will provide a sense of how robust the phenomenon is:
Fishy smells induce suspicion, negative moral evaluation lessens
the value of money, wiping the slate clean allows one to ignore
past mistakes, unburdening yourself of a secret lowers the esti-
mation of the upward slant of hills, and many more cases
where metaphor circuitry linking two brain areas leads to behav-
ior deriving from the physical metaphor linkage. Enjoy these:
(Boroditsky, 2000; Singer et al., 2004, 2006; Aziz-Zadeh et al.,
2006; Gibbs, 2006; Wilson and Gibbs, 2007; Casasanto, 2008;
Boulenger et al., 2009; IJzerman and Semin, 2009; Schubert and
Koole, 2009; Landau et al., 2010; Sapolsky, 2010; Desai et al.,
2011; Lee and Schwarz, 2011, 2012; Saygin et al., 2011; Fay and
Maner, 2012; Mattingly and Lewandowski, 2013; Pitts et al., 2013;
Deckman et al., 2014; Galinsky et al., 2014; Knowles et al., 2014;
Masicampo and Ambady, 2014; Sassenrath et al., 2014; Schoel
et al., 2014; Slepian et al., 2014; Stellar and Willer, 2014).
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THE NEURAL METAPHOR SYSTEM
This should not be thought of as amere laundry list of cases.What
links then together are the mechanisms that create the neural
metaphor system—the neural learning mechanisms, the mapping
circuits, the bindings, and the best-fit condition. “Best-fit” is more
accurately called the conservation of energy law, namely, maxi-
mize the activation of existing circuitry with strong synapses that
takes the least energy. Why, for example, should smelling fishy
be behaviorally connected to suspicion (Lee and Schwarz, 2012)?
The metaphor system contains all of the following. Note that spe-
cial cases are instances of neural bindings of special to general
cases that have been learned.
• Morality is Purity, Immorality is Rottenness
Experiential basis: In eating, pure food correlates with
well-being, rotten food, with ill-being
(Lakoff, 2008, Ch. 4)
• Thinking is Bodily Functioning.
Special cases: Communication is Sending; Thinking
Is Eating: Understanding Is Digesting
Understanding Is Perceiving: special
case: Smelling
• Achieving a Purpose is Acquiring a Desired Object (Lakoff and
Johnson, 1999, Ch. 11)
Special Case: Achieving a Purpose is Getting Desirable food
A Difficulty Is Getting Undesirable food
Special Case: Rotten food
Special Case: Rotten fish
• Definition: Suspicion is an understanding that someone has
acted immorally to thwart someone else’s purposes without
their knowledge.
Here we have primary metaphors with special cases. They fit
together to form a fixed complexmetaphor system that defines the
abstract concept of suspicion. Because this is an existing complex
neural metaphor system in the brain, it can be activated in exper-
iments to prime behavior. That is what is going on in embodied
cognition experiments that show metaphor influencing behavior.
What is particularly interesting in the Lee and Schwarz paper
is what they call “bidirectionality” in “metaphorical effects” in the
experiments. They showed not just that fishy smells induce suspi-
cion, but that by inducing suspicion in subjects, that subjects were
better able to distinguish the smell of fish oil from other smelly oils.
Their point is that, while other experiments show unidirectional,
source to target metaphorical effects in experiments, they could
produce bidirectional experimental effects.
What does this mean? Bear in mind that bidirectionality of
experimental effect may or may not mean bidirectionality of the
metaphorical mapping.
There are two important considerations not discussed by
the experimenters. First, in Narayanan’s neural theory of con-
ceptual metaphor, STDP (spike-timing dependent plasticity)
changes bidirectional ordinary Hebbian circuitry by strengthen-
ing synapses in the regularly first-spiking direction andweakening
synapses in the opposite direction. Strengthening and weakening
produces relative asymmetry, not absolute asymmetry. Moreover,
the amount of strengthening and weakening depends on how
regularly there is spiking in one direction rather than the other.
In short, there should be variation in degree. Weakening does not
mean no activation in that direction, only less, often much less.
But it may still be enough to produce priming effects.
Narayanan’s STDP theory makes the following prediction:
Activating a conceptual domain that is a metaphorical target
of one or more conceptual metaphors will provide some (often
little) activation of one or more source domains of various
metaphors. That is, a target domain can prime (to some extent,
perhaps small) possible sources. For example, divorce should
prime the splitting apart, going in separate directions. Difficulties
should prime burdens, roadblocks, containment, uphill climbs,
etc. Success should prime climbing ladders, getting fruit, reaching
destinations, and so on. Cognitive linguists studying metaphor
have long noticed such effects intuitively.
Second, there is the issue of language in general: the rela-
tion between words and their meaning is bidirectional. This is
especially true of idioms that are both imageable and metaphor-
ical. Smell fishy is such an idiom. It has an olfactory image. One
can imagine what rotten fish (or fish oil) smells like. This could
account for the bidirectional effect of the experiment, as follows.
Suspicion activates the idea of the immoral thwarting of some-
one’s purposes. Immorality weakly primes rottenness (one of
the primary metaphorical sources), and purposefulness weakly
primes getting food to eat (one of the primary metaphorical
sources), which in turn would thwart eating. Rotten food has the
special case of smelly fish, and that smell image primes the idiom.
That weak priming may still be strong enough to help distinguish
fish oil smells from other smells.
Moreover, these are not mutually exclusive and the effects
could combine in the experiment to yield a bidirectional exper-
imental effect. The Lee and Schwarz experiment is lovely and
points to the need to better understand the difference between
unidirectionality in metaphorical mapping and unidirectionality
in experimental effect.
METAPHORICAL INFERENCE: THE INVARIANCE HYPOTHESIS
How can conceptual metaphors provide content to abstract con-
cepts, and how can different conceptual metaphors for a concept
provide different content?
The circuitry constituting primarymetaphors makes use of the
structure of the source concept to reason about the target con-
cept (Lakoff, 1993). For example, consider States, e.g., depression,
confusion, etc. A State is understood metaphorically as a con-
tainer, that is, a bounded region in space. Just as you can be in
a bounded region, you can be in a state, just as you can enter
a bounded region, you can enter a state, just as you can get out
of a bounded region, you can get out of a state. The concept of
a bounded region is used in the mapping from space to states.
Or consider an executing schema that carries out a process. If
you are building a house, the house is not yet finished. If you are
metaphorically building an institution, the institution is still not
complete.
Metaphor mappings are many-to-many.
• A target can have many sources. For example, Anger can be
seen as Heat (boiling mad, all burned up, seething), Pressure
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(He exploded), Madness (go crazy, an insane rage), A Wild
Animal (bristling with anger, unleashed his anger, a ferocious
temper), and so on.
• Many targets can have the same source. Thus, More is Up,
Good is Up, Happy is Up, and so on.
• The same linguistic metaphor can express conceptual
metaphors with opposite meanings. For example, It’s downhill
from here can be an instance of Good is Up; Bad is Down
and mean that things are getting worse. Or it can be instance
of Action is Motion and Ease of Action is Downhill Motion,
and can mean that things are getting easier. Another example
is Let’s move the meeting ahead. If Time is conceptualized as
moving toward you, front to back, then the meeting is to be
moved back in time, toward the past. If time is conceptualized
as a landscape that you move over, then the meeting is to be
moved to the future.
Embodiment and meaningfulness
Primitive concepts and primary metaphors are at the heart of any
neural theory of concepts. The reason is that they are all embod-
ied, and embodiment is what makes concepts meaningful, linking
what is going on in our brains to our understanding of the real
world.
That does not mean that we understand the real world as it is
in some objective sense. But it does mean that we understand the
world on the basis of certain of our real experiences in it, even
if our understanding is metaphorical in nature, as it commonly
is. Metaphorical understanding of our experience is a natural
consequence of being neural beings with both bodies and brains
connected as they are, with the kind of neural learning capacities
that we have.
Abstract concepts don’t just float in the air. They have to be
given embodied meaning somehow. Embodied metaphor is a
major mechanism for characterizing how we understand abstract
concepts.
COMMON COMPLEXES OF PRIMARY METAPHORS
Neural binding does not just create complex schemas. It also
creates complex metaphors, many of them so commonplace
as go unnoticed. A Linear Scale is a Vertical Line with a
schema bound to it. The schema has a Bottom, a Top, and
Distances from the Bottom to points along the line. The ver-
tical line with this schema also has a metaphor bound to it:
More Is Up; Less is Down, where the verticality is in the source
domain of the primary metaphor. This has a metaphorical
inference, namely, Comparison of Amount Is Relative Height.
Thus, Your income is higher than mine and You have a big-
ger income than me both mean that you make more money
than me.
To this complex we bind the primary metaphor Change is
Motion. Then, My income rose and My income grew both mean
that my income changed so that I made moremoney.
Now consider the commonplace primary metaphor, Linear
Scales are Paths. This primary metaphor can be seeing in
expressions like Harry is way ahead of Bill in athletic ability
and Sally’s intellect is way beyond Max’s. The metaphor is as
follows:
• Source of Motion maps to Bottom of Line.
• Location along Path of Motion maps to Point on Line.
• Distance from Source of Motion maps to Height on Line.
• Being Ahead maps to Being Higher.
• Being Behind maps to Being Lower.
We now bind another metaphor to this complex: Fictive motion,
or A Line Is the Motion Tracing the Line. This is the metaphor
in sentences like The road runs through the woods and The roof
slopes downward. Binding this metaphor to the complex we have
yields sentences like Sally’s intellect goes way beyond Max’s and
Corporate profits are far outpacing wages, where the motion of go
and outpace trace the distance along the vertical line.
To this complex we now bind another primary metaphor:
Purposes Are Destinations, as discussed above. This has the
metaphorical inference that Success Is Upward Motion and
Failing is Falling. This yield sentences like She is climbing the lad-
der of success and The middle class is falling further behind the
one percent. Note that behind in falling behind suggests forward
motion, while falling suggests upward motion against a force
pulling one downwards.
Suppose we now bind to the Purposes are Destinations
metaphor an Impediment to Motion, namely, a Rigid Container
that constrains motion out of the container. This gives rise to
metaphorical sentences like It’s hard to climb out of poverty, He’s
trapped in poverty and She started climbing the corporate ladder
and hit the glass ceiling.
This metaphor complex includes a Vertical line with a
Bottom to top schema bound to it, and metaphors More Is Up,
Comparison of Amount is Relative Height, Change is Motion,
Linear Scales are Paths, A Line Is the Motion Tracing the Line,
Purposes Are destinations, Success is Upward Motion and Failing
is Falling, and Being in a Rigid Container constrains Motion Out
of It. Because these are virtually all primary metaphors, we learn
complexes of them with ease, without noticing all that is in the
complex. Indeed, when one does notice the metaphors in the
complex, a sentence like He’s trapped in poverty may seem literal.
The NeuroscienceMoral: Such complex conceptual metaphors
are embodied via many different brain regions. There no sin-
gle region for understanding complex ideas of any sort. Current
neuroscience techniques are not likely to find evidence of all
the metaphors in such a complex. Neuroscientists studying the
anatomy of activation by metaphor with current techniques
should probably keep to simple cases.
A General Moral: Primary metaphors—even complexes of
many of them—are so natural, embodied, and deep that they
can structure ones understanding without noticing that they are
there. The neuroscience of concepts leads to a general princi-
ple: You can only understand what the neural circuitry in your
brain allows you to understand. If you don’t notice that you are
using circuitry that is metaphorical, you will take the metaphors
as being literal.
LINGUISTIC METAPHORS
Since language expresses thought, language expresses metaphor-
ical thought as well. But in addition, grammars allow language
to combine thoughts to produce an unlimited range of possible
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org December 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 958 | 9
Lakoff Mapping the brain’s metaphor circuitry
thoughts. That works for linguistic metaphor as well. Grammar
allows us to combine metaphors to produce an unlimited range
of new metaphorical ideas—a range that draws on primary
metaphors and basic complexes of primary metaphors, but which
goes way beyond those. The contemporary study of figurative lan-
guage draws upon primary metaphor and complexes of primary
metaphor, combining with grammar to produce that unlim-
ited range of complex metaphorical thought (See Dancygier and
Sweetser, 2014).
The simplest case of linguistic metaphor makes use of sim-
ulation in context. Imagine someone offering an explanation
of something and his respondent says That’s just not clear.
In the Thought As Vision metaphor system, Understanding
Is Seeing Clearly. In the context of a proposed explanation,
the word clear activates the Thought as Vision system and
the sentences metaphorically conveys that the speaker doesn’t
understand the explanation. The context activates the target
domain of the metaphor and the language supplies the source
domain.
Another simple case is a head noun preceded by a modifying
adjective, as in brilliant student. Here the noun student is the tar-
get concept and the adjective brilliant is the metaphorical source.
In the Thought as Vision system, an especially bright light source
enables especially clear vision, by oneself and/or others. Metaphor
simulation is needed here. A student is someone who is trying
to understand some subject matter. If that student is a source
of metaphorical light, then the student has a capacity that is a
causal source of her own clear understanding. That constitutes
her “brilliance.”
Sullivan points out that the adjective in such cases cannot be
the target and the noun, the source. Thus, ∗intelligent light is
metaphorically ill-formed, where intelligent is the target and light
is the source. However, there are cases where the adjective is tar-
get and noun is source, namely, where the adjective is a domain
adjective, that is, an adjective that names a domain, as in spiritual,
where “emotional” specifies that target domain as emotion and
“intelligence” is applied from the source domain of the cognition.
A linguistically naïve view of metaphor characterizes the basic
form of a metaphor as A is B (as in “the student is brilliant”),
where A is the target and B is the source. But that fails in the
case of domain adjectives. Spiritual wealth has spiritual defin-
ing the target domain and wealth defining the source domain. To
understand spiritual wealth, you have to try to simulate a frame-
to-frame mapping from the domain of wealth to the domain
of spirituality, for example, a considerable wealth might map to
considerable spirituality, multiple forms of wealth might map to
multiple forms of spirituality. But the A is B form is not avail-
able for spiritual wealth. ∗His wealth is spiritual is ill-formed in
metaphorical grammar. To get some sense of the range of such
cases, consider emotional intelligence, but not ∗His intelligence is
emotional; economic war, but not ∗This war is economic.
Metaphor is woven into grammar in complex ways. A common
example of metaphor in grammar is described as the construc-
tion the X of Y, where X is a metaphor source and Y is a metaphor
target. But the real examples are more complex. Consider the fol-
lowing examples:He is in the grip of anger.We’re riding in the fast
lane on the freeway of love.
In the first case there are two metaphors that act together:
Emotions Are Exerters of Force and Control is Control by the
Hands. Anger is a special case of an emotion exerting force and
thereby control, which is metaphorically control by the hands.
That is what it means to be in the “grip” of anger.
In the second case, the metaphors are Love is a Journey and
Action is Motion. But there is an extra wrinkle. The freeway is a
metonymy; it stands for travel on a freeway. Driving in the fast
lane is the specific mode of travel. It is exciting. It is reckless. You
could get hurt. The sentence as a whole, with that construction
and the metonymy describes a reckless love affair that is exciting
but can lead to emotional harm.
Everyday complexity of linguistic metaphors
Metaphors play crucial roles in complex ideas. On Sunday, June
26, 2011, the following headline appeared in the main column on
the front page of the NY Times. It was read by millions:
Insiders Sound an Alarm
Amid a Natural Gas Rush
Productivity of Shale Wells is a Concern —
Investor Flood Spurs Talk of Bubble
Let us look at some of the metaphors, one at a time.
Insiders. An institution is understood as a Container, with an
inside and an outside. Those on the inside of the institution
are called “insiders.” The natural gas industry is such an insti-
tution. “Insiders” have “inside information” that the institution
tries to keep inside, often because the stock price would change
(in this case, fall) if the true information were known “outside”
the industry.
Sound an alarm. An alarm is a loud warning sound indicating
immediate danger. To “sound” an alarm is to create a loud alarm
sound heard by those in danger of being significantly harmed. In
this case, the metaphorical “harm” is financial. Financial “harm”
is understood as loss of money in the market.
Putting these together, we form the idea that people with
“inside information” about an industry are loudly warning that
investors in that industry may lose a lot of money on their stock
investments.
Amid. Amid is a spatial term indicating that a physical entity is
surrounded by a lot of other physical entities.
Natural gas rush. This is a metaphor based on “Gold Rush,” in
which a large number of people with little real information trav-
eled hurriedly to find gold for the taking. Some did get very rich,
but most people worked very hard digging for gold without find-
ing any. In this metaphor, what is preserved is the “rush to get
rich quick.” What is changed is that natural gas has replaced gold
as the way to get rich quick.
Putting all this together via bindings, we get: People working
for the natural gas industry who have “inside information” find
themselves surrounded by people trying to get rich quick in the
natural gas industry and are warning those people of possible loss
of money in natural gas stock.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org December 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 958 | 10
Lakoff Mapping the brain’s metaphor circuitry
Cases like this are everywhere. Just pick up a newspaper or
newsmagazine and start reading. The individual metaphors con-
tribute pieces of knowledge. To piece this knowledge together, the
meanings of the individual metaphors have to be combined. That
is, neural circuitry must be activated to form an overall coher-
ent meaning, In the neural theory of language, the problem of
what gets bound together neurally is called the “best fit” prob-
lem: what circuitry can be activated with the least energy to fit
the pieces together? The brain is a physical system that works by
conservation of energy. The stronger the synapses in a circuit, the
less energy it takes to activate that circuit. That means that cir-
cuitry with the strongest existing synapses are most likely to be
activated to form a best fit. In short, the brain will tend to use
what it already knows as much as possible to create a “best fit.”
Neural computational modeling of “best fit” for a limited
range of cases has been done by Bryant (2009).
COMPLEX METAPHORICAL BLENDS
Consider the example, “Investor Flood Spurs Talk of Bubble.”
The concept of “inflation” is based on an economic metaphor
that real value is substance, and “inflated value” is made up partly
of substance and partly of air. Real value is the ability to yield
at least a certain amount of profit on an ongoing basis. Inflation
occurs when the price of a stock or property gets higher than its
real value. Metaphorically, the inflated part of the value is air, not
substance.
The concept of a “bubble” comes with an image and knowl-
edge about the image: the bubble is constituted of a fixed amount
of substance. The bubble gets bigger when air is pumped into it.
The amount of substance is fixed, most of the bubble is air with
no substance, and the surface of the bubble gets thinner as the
bubble gets bigger. Eventually, the surface gets so thin that bubble
breaks and collapses.
In the stock market, a metaphorical bubble is a fixed amount
of stock or property. As more people invest in it, the price may go
up while the real value does not. That is, there is no “substance”
to the investments. Eventually, the amount of value per unit of
price is so little, that investors withdraw their investments, and the
value drops precipitously (“a collapse”). The primary metaphors
here are Real Value Is Substance, Inflated Value Is Air;More Is Up;
and A Success is A Rise; A Failure is A Fall. Success in investing
is a gain of real value of investments. Failure in investing means a
loss of real value of investments.
In a market segment, a certain amount of investment is needed
for the market segment to produce real value. Too many investors
can drive stock prices up beyond real value and result in inflated
value. Too much inflation produces the threat of a “bubble”
that will break, and result in a considerable loss in the value of
investments.
A literal flood is large body of uncontrolled rushing water that
can sweep people up in it, can do a lot of damage, and harm those
caught in the flood. An “investor flood” is a metaphorical flood
made up of investors. This is made up of a primary metaphor,
Multiplex Is Mass, in which a large number of unspecified indis-
tinguishable individuals is conceptualized as a fluid mass, as when
you see hundreds of sheep at a distance as a sheep, or when
you see a lot of people as a crowd flowing through the streets.
Investors who buy stock in a market segment are metaphorically
understood as “entering” the market segment. Thus, the market
segment is understood as a bounded region of space, and buying
stock that is part of that market segment is seen as “entering.” A
flood moves in a direction, and hence an “investor flood” refers
to a large mass of investors entering a single area of the market.
The word “spur” literally refers to the spur on the boot of
someone riding a horse. The rider spurs the horse to make it
move by inflicting a small pain creating fear of a greater pain to
come if the horse does not move. The primary metaphor here is
Action Is Motion. “Spur” means to cause action by inflicting fear
of pain. The second metaphor used is Financial Loss Is Painful
Harm. Metaphorically, “spur” in this case means that the uncon-
trolled flood of investors in natural gas is causing talk of a bubble
because of a fear of financial loss.
Understanding “Investor Flood Spurs Talk of Bubble”makes use
of a number of very general metaphors: Multiplex Is Mass; More
Is Up, Less Is Down; Success is Rising, Failing is Falling; Action is
Motion; Financial Loss Is Pain; Real Value Is Substance, Inflation
is Air. In addition certain frames are used: A flood frame, a bubble
frame, and a spurring frame. From the perspective of the brain,
these are neurally activated and neurally bound together in just
the right way via grammar and what is called “best fit.”
Note thatmeaning of “Investor Flood Spurs Talk of Bubble” does
not first assign a literal meaning to the phrase and then apply a
metaphor directly to the whole. Rather pieces activate fixed and
very general conceptual metaphors and frames, which are then
fit together via both grammar and neural best-fit mechanisms to
make the most sense in context.
This is common in poetic metaphors. Dylan Thomas wrote
“Do not go gentle into that good night.” The sentence has no
literal meaning. But it has a powerful metaphorical meaning
since it evokes three metaphors for death. “Go” activates Death
Is Departure, as in “He’s left us.” “Night” activates Death is
Darkness. And “Gentle” activates Life is a Struggle and Death
is Giving up the Struggle. The sentence as a whole is given
metaphorical meaning via these three conceptual metaphors,
each applying to different words in the sentence.
But one doesn’t have to look to headlines or poetry. Ordinary
language also works this way. Take a sentence like, “Because he
skipped steps, what he said didn’t add up.” Again, the sentence
has no literal meaning. Two metaphors are used. “Skipped steps”
evokes Thinking Is Moving and Rational Thinking is Moving
Step-by-Step. “Didn’t add up” evokes Thinking Is Adding, A
Thought is a number to be “counted” in the addition, and the
Conclusion of an Argument Is the Sum (as in “Let me sum up”).
NEURAL BINDING CREATES “BLENDS”
To complete the picture we have given of the current state of
metaphor theory, we need to consider some examples of “blends”
(Fauconnier and Turner, 2002; Grady et al., 1999). During the
home run race in which Mark McGuire and Sammy Sosa sought
to break the home run records of Babe Ruth (60 in 154 games) and
Roger Maris (61 in 162 games), the race was portrayed visually by
a cartoon that appeared daily in newspapers. In the cartoon, a
number of batters were lined up as in a race, with the one “ahead”
on the right and the ones “behind” on the left. The text might read
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something like “McGuire is two games behind Ruth,” “McGuire
catches up with Ruth,” and “McGuire passes Ruth.” Themetaphor
being used was: An attempt to break a record Is a Race between the
Challengers and the Record Holder. In addition there was a neural
binding. Babe Ruth played many years before McGuire and Sosa,
and was long dead whenMcGuire and Sosa challenged his record.
To allow the metaphor to apply, a neural binding is needed, iden-
tifying Ruth of yesteryear and the contemporary challengers as
racers in the same race at the current time. The metaphor, plus
the neural binding, creates what is called a “blend.”
Another classic example of a “blend” can be seen in cases where
the following metaphor applies.
The Profession Metaphor:
A Person who performs actions with a certain characteristic.
Is A Member of a Profession known for that characteristic.
This is a metaphor, but it also has a neural binding across
the source and target: the “characteristic” must be the same. The
result of the metaphor plus the binding is called a “blend.” The
most famous example is the pair:
(1) My butcher is a surgeon.
(2) My surgeon is a butcher.
These draw upon the following frame-based knowledge:
The Butcher Frame: A butcher is someone who characteristi-
cally cuts without care and control.
The Surgeon Frame: A surgeon is someone who characteristi-
cally cuts with great care and control.
The same metaphor applies in both cases, but with differ-
ent “characteristics” and different professions. In (1), the source
domain Profession uses the Surgeon Frame (a special case of
Profession), and the “characteristic” is “cutting with great care
and control.” In (2), the source domain Profession uses the
Butcher Frame (a different special case of Profession) and the
“characteristic” is “cutting without care and control.” The exam-
ple uses three kinds of mechanism: A metaphor, a binding, and
two frames that are special cases of Profession in the source
domain of the metaphor.
METAPHORS APPLY TO NARRATIVES
In any culture, there are narratives. Each narrative has certain
dimensions of structure. There is a frame structure, a linear order
structure, an emotion structure, and a metaphor structure. The
clearest description of how these metaphorical narratives work
is given in Chapter 1 of The Political Mind (Lakoff, 2008). The
emotion structure is particularly interesting.
The Hero-Villain narrative begins with a Villain doing harm
or threatening a Victim: Hearing of the harm, you feel anger or
outrage. The Hero encounters the Villain and you don’t know
who is going to win. You feel fear or anxiety. The Hero wins.
You feel relief and joy. Such “canned emotions” are built into
narrative structures. Moreover, the Hero-Villain narrative can
apply, via metaphor, to a political race, to scientific discovery
(e.g., The Double Helix), to a whistle-blower at a company that
is endangering the public (e.g., Erin Brockovich).
Jenny Lederer has analyzed a children’s story from this per-
spective. For example, there is a story about a young fish
(“The Noble Gnarble”) living at the bottom of the ocean who
wants to see sunlight. The fish swims up and up, encountering
a new danger at each level and overcoming the danger by virtue
of what would normally be seen as a handicap that happens to
be just the advantage needed to escape the danger. The story is
a classical Overcoming-Obstacles-to-Reach-a-Noble-Goal narra-
tive, applied metaphorically to a young fish. Such metaphorical
narratives are everywhere.
HOW DOWE UNDERSTAND REALLY COMPLEX METAPHORS?
Metaphorical understanding is based on the embodiment
imposed by primary metaphors, which arise via ordinary neural
mechanisms when commonplace embodied experiences regu-
larly occur together. Linguistic expressions that are metaphorical
are typically complex from a conceptual point of view. They
may use a number of conceptual metaphors (many of them
primary metaphors) as well as frames and bindings. What are
called “blends” arise from metaphors and/or frames plus neural
bindings.
What neural bindings occur is often a matter of grammar plus
“best fit” in context. According to our current theory of “best-fit,”
complex neural circuitry is activated in context when that cir-
cuitry has the overall strongest synaptic strength in that context,
and therefore can be activated with the least energy.
What is remarkable is that this is done instantly. No special
talent is needed. Millions of readers read the above headlines in
the NY Times, understood them instantly, and never noticed that
there was anything unusual about them.
CASCADES
Narayanan and I are in the process of developing a theory of
neural cascades to make sense of this data and much more. We
distinguish learned cascade circuitry from a functioning cascade
of activation and inhibition. Cascades are two-way circuits link-
ing diverse brain regions connected to the body, allowingmeaning
from multiple realms of embodied experience to “give meaning”
to linguistic, gestural, and other aspects of form. Each link in a
cascade circuit does very little, but they add up to produce all of
human thought.
EMBODIMENT: THE CENTRAL ISSUE
All of what we have been discussing stress the centrality of embod-
iment as the mechanism of meaningfulness. It may be relatively
obvious that sensorimotor embodiment plays a role in concepts
that are not abstract, like running, kicking, seeing, smelling, and
obvious concepts having to do with acting and perceiving. The
neural theory of metaphor allows for the sensorimotor system to
account for the meaning of abstract concepts as well, in the ways
that we have seen throughout this paper.
A theory of cascades is necessary for two reasons: In com-
plex concepts that make use of multiple primary concepts and
primary metaphors, there will be a multiplicity of embodiment.
Cascade theory provides the circuitry necessary to carry this out.
it also provides the circuitry necessary to link the embodiment
of linguistic form (in sound, writing, sign, and gesture) to the
embodiment of meaning.
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MULTIMODALITY, NOT MODULARITY
A major moral: From all the examples given above, it should be
clear that there is no one “module” in the brain that handles
language, or metaphor, or abstract thought. It takes extensive cas-
cade circuits linking many diverse brain regions to allow for the
indefinitely large variety of human reason and imagination.
EPILOG
This volume is a contribution to the scientific study of how
the human brain can give rise to the details of thought and
language—in this case, metaphorical thought and language.
Neuroscience alone cannot answer this question, since it does
not study the details of thought and language. Cognitive lin-
guistics does. Hence, this paper. Experimental embodied cogni-
tion research also contributes scientific research on this issue.
And finally, neural computation of the sort pioneered by Srini
Narayanan has allowed us to model the requisite neural circuitry
and neural learning mechanisms.
The very existence of this volume is testimony to the desire
for cooperation across four disciplines, an integration of which is
necessary to address this issue. I would like to express my grati-
tude to Frontiers and to the editors of this volume for taking on
such a cooperative scientific enterprise.
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